Sunday, March 24, 2013

On Ethiopia’s Legitimate Claim To Its Natural Seashores


Professor Negussay Ayele

Cartographic Images of Border Regimes—1936-1991

       In an earlier (June 17,2000) article entitled Reflections on Border Regimes and Colonial Treaties (originally posted on www.ethiopians.com) and also appeared in RAIJ, an Ethiopian periodical published in Germany, I generated a discourse on the status of Ethiopia-Eritrea borders and the obsolescence of "colonial treaties." In the present article, we shall take the discussion to its next logical step by raising some fundamental questions about Ethiopia’s natural, legitimate rights related to its northern borders. We embark on that task with a cartographic recapitulation of the relevant border regimes outlined in the aforementioned article. 
What I have tried to do heretofore is to forewarn all concerned--especially the rulers of Ethiopia--of certain false premises (at times deliberately espoused) and concomitant fatal flaws in decision-making with regard to Ethiopia-Eritrea borders and territorial issues leading in part to the recent spate of armed conflicts in the region.
     Fascist Italy made the first Ethiopia-Eritrea border regime spanning the period of 1896-1936 obsolete when it invalidated the treaties it had signed and invaded Ethiopia. It then completely changed the boundaries and instituted a new cartographic make-up of the Horn region, albeit for five years. With its deliberate unprovoked aggression, Fascist Italy violated the treaties and obliterated previous Ethiopia-Eritrea borders, which were operational between colonial Italy and Ethiopia. Therefore, those colonial treaties pertaining to the Ethiopia-Eritrea borders were rendered null and void as of 1936. 
      It should be stated that the same could not be said, for instance, with respect to other boundary agreements signed between Ethiopia and the erstwhile colonial powers in the region in 1897 and thereafter. To date, these have been considered valid international instruments, and the borders of successor states on the Horn including French (Jibouti), Anglo-Egyptian (Sudan) and British East African territories in the region such as (Kenya) and (Somaliland), have been generally mutually respected. In the event of disputes on delimitation and/or demarcation of boundaries between Ethiopia and the said polities, those colonial treaties can be invoked for clarification. Likewise, to the extent needed, the 1964 OAU declaration on African borders can be cited as a guideline for resolution of disputes, with respect to the borders between Ethiopia and the said countries. EPLF Eritrea is not in this mould. Neither is the Eritrean situation analogous to East Timor.
     When Italian invading forces entered Addis Ababa in May of 1936 they altered the geopolitical landscape of the Horn. They merged Ethiopia with their colonial possessions of Eritrea and Somalia to create Italian East Africa. The boundaries between Ethiopia on the one hand and the Italian colonial entities of Eritrea and Somalia were no more. So, when the Fascists were booted out of Ethiopia-Eritrea in 1941-42, the borders of the region were no longer what they were in the pre-war period. Had the British not decided unilaterally to keep the Eritrean coastal region under their control as ‘Occupied Enemy Territory', the whole of Ethiopia-Eritrea would have re-emerged as one entity. The pretext for this unilateral action by the British was the expanding war by the Allies against the Axis powers and hence the need for Allied presence in the Horn. Needless to say, the ready image of Eritrea for the British (as the premier colonial power in Africa) was the ante bellum Italian colonial cartography they were familiar with, despite its nullification by Fascist Italy. 
     Here then is the cartographic representation of that 1936-1941 Ethiopia-Eritrea border regime.

Map 1. Ethiopia During Fascist Italy's Occupation (1936-41).

     The next Ethiopia-Eritrea border regime begins with the eviction of the Italians from the Horn in 1941, Ethiopian resumption of independence and international deliberations on the future of Italian colonies in Africa. No international body near or far raised any question or objection about borders between 1941 and 1952 and no one invoked colonial "treaties" on borders. The British had used what they perceived to be (even if they were not involved directly when these borders were determined in the first place) the pre-war borders for their temporary wartime caretaker presence in the region. As noted in my earlier article, after a decade of lobbying and jockeying by all concerned, it was decided by the United Nations in 1950 that Eritrea be federated with Ethiopia "Under the Sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown". It took the Four Power Commission (Britain, United States, France, USSR) and the United Nations nearly four painstaking years to determine the future of Eritrea. It is useful to recall here the guiding principles of UN General AssemblyResolution 390 A (V) of December 2, 1950.The sense of care with which the matter was handled can be gleaned from the following passage in the Preamble which details the grounds of the resolution:
Taking into consideration
(a) The wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea, including the views of the various racial religious and political groups of the provinces of the territory and the capacity of the people for self government,
(b) The interests of peace and security in East Africa,
(c) The rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic, or economic reasons, including in particular Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate access to the sea,…..
Recommends that: Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown."              
Article two of the resolution asserts that "the Eritrean government shall possess legislative, executive and judicial powers in the field of domestic affairs."
Article three says, inter alia, that "The jurisdiction of the Federal government shall extend to defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, foreign and interstate commerce and external and interstate communications, including ports. The Federal Government shall have the power to maintain the integrity of the Federation…"
      The United Nations also deemed that it was appropriate for Emperor Haile Sellassie to exercise the ultimate sovereign authority of ratification of both the UN-sponsored Federal Act and the Eritrean constitution. In point of fact then, the colonial question as it pertained to Eritrea was over and done with as of December, 1950 by the deliberate and legitimate decision by the United Nations (although not entirely pleasing to all the parties concerned). For purposes of the federal administration, Article two of the Eritrean Constitution also stipulated that "the territory of Eritrea, including the islands, is that of the former Italian colony of Eritrea." Hence, the Ethiopia-Eritrea federation border was not an international boundary separating two sovereignties or two discrete entities. It was an internal administrative line--no matter where it was drawn or what resemblance it had to the pre-1936 era--within one sovereign Ethiopian State. It was recognized as such—for nearly forty years--from 1952 on by the UN, (and a decade or so later by the OAU) and all along by the global community of nations, including the United States. 

   Subsequently, all international agreements with respect to land, air, coastal space, ports in the Eritrean region as well as naval concerns on the Red Sea and bases, like the U.S Kagnew communications base in Asmara, were duly concluded and maintained between the Ethiopian government and international actors. Meanwhile, the region (not just the port) of Asseb was governed as part of Wello province for manifest cultural, economic, political, historical and logistical reasons, even though the government of the day opted not to have this political reality reflected in physical cartographic form.
     The bottom line here is that as of 1952, Ethiopia’s de jure international boundary in the North recognized by the whole world, was the thousand kilometers long shores of the Red Sea, not Eritrea. Of course, internal ELF/EPLF secessionist struggles a la Biafra, Shabia, Anya Nya in Africa were joined in the region. A federated country is one country under a single sovereignty regardless of ongoing secessionist movements or civil wars in it. Aside from opinions alluding to the subject, the UN Resolution did not enunciate what to do in the event of a critical constitutional issue in the federal system, such as what happened in 1962, when the Eritrean assembly voted to abolish the federation and opt for outright union. What is known is the fact that the United Nations did not react one way or another on the change of status from federal to union at the time or thereafter. Curiously, under the zealous guidance of then Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, the UN, along with the TPLF in Addis Ababa, facilitated and expedited the process of EPLF-Eritrean secession from 1991 through 1993.
That 1952-1987 cartographic rendition of the administrative border regime of Ethiopia- Eritrea was as follows.


Map 2. Ethiopia between 1952-1987.

       After some thirty-five years of the border regime depicted above we come to another border regime which features cartographic change in Ethiopia’s internal geopolitical landscape. In 1987, the Derg government of the day opted to make extensive internal border changes to reflect its cultural, economic, political and strategic dictates. Subsequently, the whole country was reorganized into thirty units. In the north, the new map of Ethiopia comprising about a third of the Afar inhabited parts of the administrative region of Eritrea as well as Afar areas of Wello and adjacent administrative regions, as one unit designated "Asseb Autonomous Region." The other two-thirds of the Eritrean administrative region became "Autonomous Region of Eritrea.

      This cartographic modification or change of Ethiopia’s internal territorial shape was the border regime that EPLF and TPLF found in place when they took over in Asmara and Addis Ababa in 1991. Predictably, EPLF and its allies did not like that internal adjustment. Nevertheless, unless one denies the verity of Ethiopian sovereignty in 1987, and hence its legal competence to make cartographic changes within its sovereign territory, these internal border adjustments represent the legitimate exercise of the government in power at the time. Note the fact that the TPLF government has redrawn the internal borders of what is left of Ethiopia regardless of objections to it in some quarters. Hence, there was no legal basis or dictate for an incoming government in Addis Ababa to hark back to an obsolescent colonial border regime and carve out forty six thousand square miles of territory including all of Ethiopia’s natural seashores to EPLF.
     Nowadays, the TPLF regime expends a great deal of psychic and other energies arguing in "parliament" and other forums that Asseb belongs to EPLF-Eritrea. Incredible as it may sound, the Addis Ababa regime argues more on behalf of Eritrean rights to Ethiopia’s seashores than Mr. Isaiass Afeworqi himself. In fact, under the circumstances, he does not have to say anything about what he has obtained in 1991-93 beyond his expectations by a skillful combination of force, deceit, internal treachery and international intervention. The de facto situation is that he still holds on to his unconscionably acquired bounty. In 1998, he lunged for more territory in the rest of Ethiopia. The problem many Ethiopians have been facing from 1991 to 1998, with regard to the problems of Ethiopia-Eritrea, is that they have had a two-pronged struggle. Even before alternative Ethiopian viewpoints get to confront the Eritrean side, such views have to get past its TPLF defenders. In effect, one has to do battle (of words or swords) with both EPLF and TPLF alternately or simultaneously, instead of working on a consensus for Ethiopia’s national interest. The TPLF acted as the chief of staff of the EPLF during this period --especially prior to 1998—to the detriment of all. The Reporter, a monthly periodical in Addis Ababa, put the problem thusly in its May, 1998, issue:
The problems pertaining to relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea ought to be reexamined in their entirety. The policy (vis-à-vis Eritrea) which until now has remained murky and nebulous should be crystal clear and categorical. We should be able to enunciate confidently the nature of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. And, this is our right as citizens. We should not just plod on complaining like the man who, when asked to beat his in-law, said, "but how can I go past my wife?" (Personal translation).
     The cartographic rendition of that 1987 border regime apropos to northern Ethiopia is represented in the map below.


Map 3. The 1987 Border Regime of Ethiopia  (1987-91).

     When the current rulers in Addis and Asmara took over in 1991, Eritrea was not a colony of Ethiopia or a UN Trust territory or a sovereign state, and there was NO international (colonial or otherwise) boundary separating Ethiopia-Eritrea. Since 1952, the borderline denoting Eritrea was an internal administrative one. And, ELF/EPLF elements were not fighting against colonialism as colonial Italy was not ruling Ethiopia-Eritrea at the time, and the Ethiopian governments of the period were not viceroys of colonial Italy. The colonial question with regard to Eritrea was over and done with as of 1952. The "autonomous unit" of Eritrea "federated under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown" had no de jure international boundaries affirmed by international law, confirmed by valid treaties and recognized by the global community of nations individually or collectively for at least four decades. The desideratum of a separate Eritrean entity in its present cartograhic form is the product of ELF/EPLF secessionist elements. The EPLF-PFDJ strongman, Mr Issaiass, was quoted by Time Magazine in Addis Ababa in 1991, to have said, "Forget history; man makes history, and we have made an independent Eritrea." EPLF’s force cum propaganda scheme has thrived by obfuscating or obliterating historical facts and realities. EPLF’s objectives and its myth of the "colonial question" were swallowed whole and facilitated materially and morally by TPLF, culminating in EPLF Eritrean secession. In a 331-page policy document,Struggle of Eritrean People: From Where To Where, issued in 1987 (1979 Eth.Cal.) by the current TPLF leadership, one finds, for example, the following passage on Ethiopia-Eritrea:
The notion that Eritrea was or is part of Ethiopia is without historical merit, and one that remains a fairy tale. The fact is that at the very moment Ethiopia emerged as a state, Eritrea, which was not part of Ethiopia, was also created as a state by Italian colonialism. Therefore, Eritrea is a self-contained state, quite distinct from Ethiopia. (Translation is personal and unofficial).
     How does this rendition of Eritrean identity square up with the prevailing view in Ethiopia at large or in Tigray, in Eritrea, or even in the rest of the world at the time that Eritrea was being "created as a state by Italian colonialism?" Despite his nationalist zeal as Ethiopia’s ruler, Eritrea was lost to the Italians during the suzerainty of Tigrayan Emperor Yohannes. Still, it was he who protested a century ago saying: "I did not give them (the Italians) Massawa; the British gave it to them…Massawa is Ethiopian and I have neither the intention nor the power to alienate any territory which properly belongs to Ethiopia." The question here is, "What gives?" How is it that an older generation of Tigrayan leadership of Ethiopia that was there says Massawa (i.e, Eritrea) is Ethiopian, and then another generation of Tigrayan leadership a century later, which was not there, says Massawa (Eritrea) was not Ethiopian? Which generation of rulers is in a better position to know? (For details on aspects of the contemporary history of the region, see my "Ras Alula and Ethiopia’s Struggles against Expansionism and Colonialism: 1872-1897" in The Centenary of Dogali, edited by Tadesse Beyene, et al, Addis Ababa, 1988).
     Outside elements near and far, with varying political agendas with regard to the integrity, viability and esteem of Ethiopia, and overall control of the Horn region, have also contributed to the secessionist cause. The net result was the de facto forced severing of 3.5 million Ethiopians in Eritrea and 121,000 or so square kilometers of Ethiopian land, including all of its natural seashores, in 1991. The Ethiopian people had no say whatsoever in this process and the TPLF had no authority to "alienate territory which properly belongs to Ethiopia"-- to borrow the words Emperor Yohannes. It is one thing for EPLF to do the break-up by force of arms, declare its de facto secession and then do its own chores to get international acceptance much as Puntland has been trying to do on the Horn since 1991. It is quite another thing for a government in Ethiopia to take gratuitous measures to actively support such secession or dismemberment of its people and sovereign territory by pleading with the UN and the rest of the outside world to recognize the act. 

     It is to be recalled that the EPLF/TPLF orchestrated the breakaway of the Eritrean region in 1991, when the rulers in Addis Ababa were still transitional. Yet, they nurtured and protected EPLF-Eritrea from any opposition through the next two honeymoon years (or chagula, as it is called in Ethiopia). The process climaxed in 1993 when the EPLF stabilized its own position in Asmara and comfortably ran its "referendum." Speaking of that "referendum", one recalls here the observation by Dr Tekeste Negash, the noted historian of Eritrean birth, who said in his 1998 article, ‘Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Cooperation to Competition,’ that "compared to what took place in terms of assessing the wishes of the Eritrean people during the two commissions of inquiry (1947 and 1950), the 1993 referendum—‘if you vote red you will be dead’--was a serious setback."
     Some members of the international community that had supported and recognized the single sovereignty of Ethiopia-Eritrea, at least since 1950, facilitated this forcible illegitimate act of politicide of Ethiopia in 1991 while others acquiesced to it as a fait accompli. Under the circumstances, any formal agreement or treaty concluded between the two colluding parties (EPLF and TPLF) to seal the border based on such illegitimate acts, at the expense of the legitimate and abiding interests of the peoples of Ethiopia-Eritrea, is bound to remain illegal and unacceptable.

Comment on Modalities of Palaver on Ethiopia-Eritrea Issues
        
         As we move to the next segment of our discussion on Ethiopia’s legitimate claim to its natural seashores, I would like to make the following point. Especially in the realm of political discourse, any argument, discussion or political proposition emanates from a certain assumption or premise. A premise may be based on actual fact or on contrived political fiat, and it may be true or it may be false. Premises may be declared or muted, but they are there and they serve as the organizing and legitimizing principles for ensuing propositions, decisions, declarations and policies of protagonists and antagonists. If a given premise is false, the proposition and policy decision based on it will, ipso facto, be flawed. But once the conclusion based on the false premise is made and policy or political decision is issued, the tendency is to be defensive to save face rather than admit one’s error. And, of course, today’s proposition or conclusion can be tomorrow’s assumption or premises, and the chain gets longer and longer. Consequently, part of the reason why it has been difficult for us Ethiopians to reach consensus on certain political matters is that we often argue issues from variant and often mutually exclusive premises thereby being unable to reach congruent propositions or conclusions. Needless to say, the process becomes even more complicated when one imagines possible discourse between EPLF elements and Ethiopians who disagree with them on the contents of the present article.
     Let me illustrate what I am trying to say. I have jotted down a number of true/false litmus test questions revolving around the topic of this article for exercise. Let us take, for example, the statement: "Eritrea is a colony of Ethiopia." To some this statement serves as a premise from which emerge a whole set of propositions. To others, it may represent a proposition based on other underlying fact(s) or fiat(s). For our purposes here, let us assume the above statement as a premise. Is the statement "Eritrea is a colony of Ethiopia" true or false? Conclusions and policy decisions that emanate from a belief or conviction that the statement is "true" are diametrically opposed to propositions and conclusions that emerge from a belief that the statement is "false." Consequently, conclusions and policies based on false premises have dire, at times bloody, outcomes even if, sooner or later, reality and superior analytic power will expose the sham. 

     With the exception of very few Eritrean commentators who are not sycophants of EPLF, has anyone found other Eritrean elites who do not subscribe to the premises of "Eritrea is a colony of Ethiopia"? I have not. So, we can safely stipulate that EPLF Eritreans take their political fiat, "Eritrea is a colony of Ethiopia," to be the bedrock premises from which they drew certain axiomatic propositions, and rationalized their "anti colonial" struggles against "colonial" Ethiopia and their "colonial borders" as legitimate and just. To them, this makes their cause a zero-sum, all or nothing, ‘green or red’ proposition vis-à-vis Ethiopia.’ They are not concerned with facts, fairness, civility, logic, morality, history or international law—especially when these do not serve their purposes. It is a ‘take it or leave it premise which is not open to question or debate. Hence, one has to accept everything that emanates from their premises and move on to the next stage.

     By a fiat declaration that "Eritrea is a colony of Ethiopia," the EPLF and its cronies claim a case of uninterrupted Eritrean colonial history--and anti colonial struggle, to boot—all the way from the nineteenth century to 1991 irrespective of what transpired in between. The logical conclusion of that train of thought is the assertion of legitimacy of its "colonial borders" (and, of course, the validity of colonial treaties)--no matter what has transpired in the historical past. That is why they would claim that the 1964 OAU Declaration with respect to borders at time of independence is applicable to Eritrea because it was a "colony of Ethiopia." In fact, EPLF considered this "Eritrea is or was colony of Ethiopia" ploy to be such a premium copyrighted trademark that it discouraged other ethnic organizations from having the first class honor to call themselves colonies of Ethiopia eligible for independence. All the "liberation" movements in Ethiopia were set to Grade II "national question" categories worthy of national autonomy, at best; that is, until Eritrea's secession was complete.

     Civil wars and secessionist struggles within independent states do not have to end with the state dismemberment or politicice. Struggles for self-determination in such cases can and do find alternative political formulas for dealing with the root causes of secessionist or civil wars in question. Although most struggles for secession have not succeeded in Africa and elsewhere, in recent years we have seen externally aided forcible breakups in Cyprus and Pakistan. There is also precedence for a voluntary, civil and peaceable split as happened with the Czech and Slovak republics. And then there is the mushrooming of new states from political implosions in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. One takes note of the drawn out peaceful, democratic and constitutional struggle in Canada with regard to the partition of Quebec. To that end, several referenda have been held democratically in which all views were openly ventilated and freely balloted. In the event that the Quebecois elect to form a separate state by a preponderant majority, the Canadian Federal Court will have to decide the constitutional modality of enacting the separation. It will also have to determine how to protect the rights of indigenous Inuit and Cree peoples in the area who have repeatedly voted to remain as Canadians as well as on the delimitation of ultimate regional boundaries of Quebec. For decades now the world has witnessed painfully the violent struggles to decide the future of Northern Ireland. We should also note that history is replete not only with examples of forcible or peaceable splits but also of forcible or civil reunifications. Relatively recent examples of the latter include Viet Nam, Germany and Yemen. Likewise, the Korean people are also proceeding, albeit turtle-like, towards reunification after more than half a century of Cold War induced dismemberment.
     In 1991, the EPLF and TPLF, the two victorious bosom allies, could have forged--in a transparent manner--at least a framework for a fair and amicable agreement on territorial, economic, security, regional and related matters, to obviate the kind of bloody and ugly display of recent years. For the record, both Mr. Meles and Mr Isaiass, and many others, were sitting and listening at the 1991 (July 1-5), "Charter" conference in Addis when the martyred Professor Asrat Weldeyes had said:
   
I submit that this conference has no authority to decide, to desist or to delete anything in the name of the Ethiopian people. However, one recognizes the prevailing de facto situation in the country, including the cessation of bloody hostilities among brothers as well as the current momentum for peace and democracy. EPRDF and EPLF can use their special close relations to see to it that the spirit of Ethiopianity and forgiveness be brought to bear to work urgently for a lasting peace between the brotherly and sisterly (Ethiopian-Eritrean) people. I respectfully submit that this is the primary mission for a transitional government. 
  
     What I have tried to do heretofore is to forewarn all concerned--especially the rulers of Ethiopia--of certain false premises (at times deliberately espoused) and concomitant fatal flaws in decision-making with regard to Ethiopia-Eritrea borders and territorial issues leading in part to the recent spate of armed conflicts in the region. The eruption of these conflicts is an index of deep-seated festering territorial problems. The conflicts, triggered by EPLF-Eritrea, also represent opportunities to correct past errors and redress imbalances and injustices that befell the Ethiopian people since 1991. The net result is expected to serve the mutual benefit of Ethiopia-Eritrea peoples. It should establish conditions for genuine lasting peace and viable regional development for all. In the next segment of my discourse, I will take a major and crucial issue that has been increasingly gaining literary visibility among Ethiopians. The issue is Ethiopia’s legitimate claim to its natural seashores on the Red Sea. Ethiopia was divested of three and a half million of its inhabitants and 121,000 square kilometers of its land with its natural seacoasts when EPLF-Eritrea seceded by force in 1991. Enough has been said of TPLF’s betrayal and of international complicity in this illegitimate but now de facto act.
         At this point, the reader is entitled to ask, "Why revisit or rehash all this past since a new 'reality' is in place on the ground with respect to the territorial divide of Ethiopia-Eritrea?" The short answer to the query is: 
(1) because EPLF-Eritrea saw fit to violently question the yet undefined and undeclared border regime of the region in 1998; 
(2) the whole process by which the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia was rammed by force and fraud on Ethiopia by EPLF and TPLF in 1991, was full of holes in the first place; 
(3) the bloody comedy of errors instigated by the colluding parties has resulted in untold and unnecessary death and destruction in the region, and this cannot be allowed to continue or recur in the future. 
     It is hoped that what follows will contribute towards a resolution of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border problem by moving the modality of discussion from its current ‘zero-sum’ status towards a more equitable ‘win-win’ game. To attain such outcomes, requires in the minimum deliberate open-minded attention to the issues concerned and to varying and competing views--other than one’s own—by the powers that be. It requires also a sense of strategic (not tactical) vision of a future for generations to come in the Horn by all concerned. It requires courage to admit mistakes rather than defend them and a firm commitment to do the right thing no matter what the repercussions on one’s person, party or power.
Foot Note:
The maps in the text are culled from Ambassador Teferra Haile Selassie's book: "The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974-91", Published in 1997 and from Mahlet Periodical (Amharic) issue of 1993.
September 26, 2000

Friday, March 22, 2013

ከጠቅላይ ፍ/ቤት እስከ ሚንስትሮች ም/ቤት

ጋዜጠኛ ተመስገን ደሳለኝ

መጋቢት 18/2005 ዓ.ም የእነ እስክንድር ነጋ ይግባኝ ለመጨረሻ ጊዜ ተብሎ ተቀጥሯል፡፡ በዚህ መዝገብ የተከሰሱት የህሊና እስረኞች ይግባኝ ከጠየቁ አምስት ወር አልፏቸዋል፡፡ 
ለምን? …በአዲስ መስመር እንነጋገርበት፡፡
የይግባኙን ውሳኔ ያዘገየው የፖለቲካ ተንታኝ እና ጋዜጠኛ እስክንድር ነጋ ጉዳይ ነው፡፡ ምክንያቱ ደግሞ የተከሰሰው በሀሰት ስለሆነ ነው፡፡ በእርግጥ ይህንን ያልኩት እኔ አይደለሁም፤ የጠቅላይ ፍርድ ቤት የመሀል ዳኛ የሆነው አቶ አማረ አሞኘ ነው፡፡ ባለፈው ወር ዳኛው አቃቢ ህጎቹን ሰበሰበና እንዲህ አላቸው፡-
‹‹ይህን ሰው አሻባሪ ነው ብላችሁ ስትከሱት ያቀረባችሁት ማሰረጃ በተለያየ ጊዜ የፃፈውን ፅሆፎች፣ ቃለ-መጠይቆች እና በአንድ የፖለቲካ ፓርቲ መድርክ ላይ ተናገረው ያላችሁትን ብቻ ነው፡፡ ሌላው ቀርቶ ፅሁፉና ንግግሩ ያስከተለው አደጋ አልተገለፀም፤ ወይም ምንም አይነት አደጋ አላስከተለም ማለት ነው፡፡ ይህ ደግሞ ተከሳሹ ላይ ቅጣት ለመጣል አያስችልም፡፡ ስለዚህም ሌላ ጥፋተኝነቱን የሚያረጋግጥ ማሰራጃ ካላችሁ አቅርቡ? አሊያም በሚቀጥለው ቀጠሮ ሲቀርብ በነፃ እለቀዋለሁ፡፡››
አቃቢ ህጎቹ ምንም ማስረጃ አልነበራቸውምና በደፈናው ‹‹ሰውየው አሸባሪ ስለሆነ ዝም ብለህ፤ ይግባኙን ውድቅ አድርግና የከፍተኛው ፍርድ ቤቱን ውሳኔ አፅናበት›› የሚል ይዘት ያለው ተመሳሳይ አቋም አንፀባረቁ፡፡ ዳኛው ምን አይነት መንፈሳዊ ኃይል ተጭኖበት እንደ ሆነ እንጃ! ‹‹በፍፁም ከህግ ውጪ አልሰራም፤ ህሊና አለኝ›› ብሎ ፍንክች ያባ ቢለዋ ልጅ ይላል፡፡
ይህን ጊዜም ነገሩ ቦግ ያደረገው አንድ አቃቢ ህግ
‹‹አንተ እስክንድርን እለቃለሁ የምትለው ያገርህ ልጅ ጎንደሬ ስለሆነ ነው!››
ይለዋል ቁጣ በተቀላቀለበት ድምፅ፡፡ ዳኛ አማረም ይበልጥ ተናዶ
‹‹እኔ እሰከ ዛሬ ድረስ ያገለገልኩት ሀገሬን ኢትዮጵያ እንጂ የትውልድ መንደሬን አይደለለም፡፡ ደግሞም ዘረኝነት የለብኝም›› ሲል መለሰለት፡፡
በእንዲህ አይነት ሁኔቴ መዋዘገቡ በመካረሩ መግባባት አልቻሉምና ጉዳዩ ሚንስትሮች ምክር ቤት ደረሰ፡፡ በሚንስትሮች ም/ቤትም ስብሰባውን የመራው ምክትል ጠቅላይ ሚንስትሩ ደመቀ መኮንን ሲሆን፣ ዳኛውም አብሮ ቀርቧል፡፡ አቶ ደመቀ መጀመሪያ ዳኛው ስለጉዳዩ ማብራሪያ እንዲሰጥ ጠየቀ፡፡ ዳኛውም ስለክሱ አጠር አድርጎ ካብራራ በኋላ እንዲህ ሲል ደመደመ፡-
‹‹እስክንድር ነጋን ‹አሸባሪ› ብሎ ለመፍረድ የሚያስችል በቂ ማስረጃ ስላልቀረበ በሚቀጥለው ቀጠሮ በነፃ አሰናብተዋለሁ፤ እንዲህ ማድረግ አትችልም የምትሉኝ ከሆነ ግን ክቡራን ሚንስትሮች በዕለቱ በችሎት ለመሰየም ፍቃደኛ አለመሆኔን በትህትና ትረዱኛላችሁ ብዬ አስባለሁ!››
ከዚህ በኋላ ሚኒስትሮቹ መወያየት ጀመሩ፡፡ ተከራከሩ፤ በመጨረሻም አቶ ደመቀ እንዲህ አለ፡-
‹‹እኔም ከአቶ አማረ ጋር እስማማለሁ፡፡ ምክንያቱም በዚህ ሰውዬ /እስክንድር/ የተነሳ ከፍተኛ አለም አቀፍ ጫና እየደረሰብን ነው፡፡ ስለዚህም ብንፈታው ተጠቃሚዎቹ እኛው ነን ብዬ አስባለሁ፡፡››
አንድ ሚኒስትር ቀጠለ፡-
‹‹በመሰረተ ሃሳቡ ላይ እስማማለሁ፡፡ ነገር ግን እስከዛሬ አስረነው ‹ነፃ ነህ› ብለን ብንለቀው የፖለቲካ ኪሳራ ስልሚያስከትልብን፣ ከፍርዱ ላይ ቅንስናሽ አድርገን ይቅርታ ጠይቆ እንዲወጣ ብናደርግ የተሻለ ነው፡፡››
ሌላ ሚኒስትር ቀጠለ፡-
‹‹እስክንድርን እኔ አውቀዋለሁ፤ የአሜሪካን ሀገር መኖሪያ ፍቃድ እና ብዙ ሀብት እያለው እዚህ ነገር ውስጥ የገባ ሰው ነው፡፡ እናም በፍፁም ይቅርታ ለመጠየቅ ፍቃደኛ አይሆንም››
ሌላኛው ሚንስትር ቀጠለ፡-
‹‹ኧረ ለመሆኑ መለስ አለም አቀፍ ጫና እንደሚያስከትል እያወቀ ለፓርቲያችን ጥቅም ብሎ የገባበትን ጉዳይ፣ ዛሬ እርሱ አልፏል ብለን ጫና ይምንፈራበት ምክንያት ከየት የመጣ ነው? በቃ! መለስ አደገኛ ሰው ነው ብሎ አስሮቷል፡፡ አለቃ! እዛው ይበስብስ!››
የሚንስትሮች ምክር ቤትም ቢዚህ ጉዳይ ላይ መስማማት ሳይችል በመቅረቱ የጠቅላይ ፍርድ ቤቱ ፕሬዘዳንት አቶ ተገኔ ቀርቦ በጉዳዩ ላይ ማብራሪያ እንዲሰጥ ቀጠሮ ይዘው ተለያዩ፡፡
…በእርግጥ ከአቶ ተገኔ ማብራሪያ በኋላ የሚኒስትሮች ም/ቤት ምን አይነት አቋም ላይ እንደደረሰ ለማወቅ ያደረኩት ጥረት ሊሳካ አልቻለም፡፡ መረጃውንም እስከ ዛሬ ያቆየሁት ለዚህ ነበር፡፡ አሁን ግን የቀጠሮ ቀን ሰለደረሰ ልነግራችሁ ተገደድኩ፡፡
እናም የፊታችን ረዕቡ ከጠቅላይ ፍርድ ቤት ከሚከተሉት አራት ነገሮች አንዱን እናያለን ብዬ አስባለሁ፡፡
1. የሚንስትሮች ም/ቤት ጫናው ስለከበደው በነፃ ይለቀዋል፣
2. መለስ እያወቀ የገባበትን ጫና አንፈራም! (ራዕዩ እናስቀጥላለን እንደማለት ነው) በማለት የከፍተኛውን ፍርድ ቤት ውሳኔ ያፀናሉ፣
3. ከተፈረደበት 18 ዓመት ላይ ቅንስናሽ አድርገው፣ ይቅርታ እንዲጠይቅ ወደ ማግባባቱ ይሄዳሉ፣
4. ዳኛው አሞኘ እንደፎከረው ከችሎቱ ይቀርና አሁንም ‹‹የመጨረሻ›› ቀጠሮ ይሰጣል፡፡
የሆነ ሆኖ እንዲህ የሚል አንድ እውነት ‹‹በመሪዎቻችን›› ግንባር ላይ ተቸክችኳል፡፡ ‹‹ሲቪሉ ጀግና እስክንድር ነጋ እያርበደበደው ነው!››
አዎ! እኔም እላለሁ፣ የእስክንድር እና መሰሎቹ የግፍ እስር አርብድብዶ ብቻ አይተዋችሁም!!
ድል ለኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ! ውድቀት ለአምባገነኖች!!

Saturday, March 16, 2013

ETHIOPIA (Western Colonialism)


Ethiopia is a country in eastern Africa, in the region known as the Horn of Africa; it was historically sometimes known as Abyssinia. Almost as large as Texas and California combined, the country consists of a large highland region surrounded by lowland deserts. Historically this geography isolated Ethiopia from its neighbors and from Europe, though external trade did take place. Geography was also a factor in Ethiopia remaining as one of only two African countries (the other was Liberia) that were never formally colonized by European powers.
Ethiopia is one of the likely origin places of humans and their near relatives, and anthropologists have found fossil hominids dating from about four million years ago there. Ethiopia is often thought to be the historical home of the Queen of Sheba and the biblical land of Punt, an important trading partner of ancient Egypt. The sophisticated Axum (Aksum) civilization developed in Ethiopia during the first century c.e., forming an empire that traded with India, Arabia, Egypt, and the Mediterranean world. This civilization was Christianized around 300 c.e. (or even earlier, according to some scholars); the Bible was translated into the local language of Geez, and churches and monasteries were built. Even today Ethiopiais a predominantly Christian country with over half the population belonging to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
The Axum empire declined around 1000 c.e. with the rise of Islam and Arab expansion. Medieval Ethiopia flourished but was isolated from the rest of Christianity. European legends of Prester John, a mythical ruler of a vast Christian empire thought to lie in Africa, stimulated European interest in the 1500s. Portugal established close relations with Ethiopia, even assisting it in its wars against Islamic invaders. After a period of instability, Ethiopia was largely unified after 1855 as a single state under the rule of Emperor Tewodros II (1818-1868). During his reign the country came into conflict with the British, who were beginning colonial expansion into East Africa.
After the power struggle following the death of Tewodros, Johannes IV (1831-1889) became emperor in 1871 and immediately found himself immersed in the colonial rivalry between British, French, Italian, and Turkish interests in the Horn of Africa. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had made Ethiopia and the Red Sea strategically important, and European powers were keen on acquiring territory in the region.
After the death of Yohannes in 1889, Menelik II (1844-1913) was crowned emperor. His policy of unification, modernization, and expansion increased the territorial size of Ethiopia and brought it technological advancement. Menelik founded a new capital at Addis Ababa and introduced such innovations as electricity, telephones, railroads, and a modern military armed with European weapons. In a dispute with Italy over claims to the Red Sea coast, he granted Italy control of Eritrea in return for Italian recognition of Ethiopia’s sovereignty. The Treaty of Wichale, signed in 1889, was in both the Italian and Amharic languages, and differences in these texts led to conflict between the two signatories: Italy interpreted the treaty as giving it protectorate status over Ethiopia, while Menelik did not. The Italians used their interpretation of the treaty to justify expansion intoEthiopian territory, precipitating the Battle of Adwa, fought between the Italians and Ethiopians in 1896. Italy was resoundingly defeated in the battle, an event significant in the history of African colonialism in that it was a clear victory of Africans over European colonial forces.
Menelik’s grandson succeeded him as ruler but was soon deposed by the Ethiopian nobility, who substituted Menelik’s daughter as empress. During this period the nobleman Ras Tafari Mekonen (1892-1975) became prince regent and the effective ruler of the country, securing its entry as a member of the League of Nations in 1923. When the empress died in 1930 Ras Tafari (whose name is the origin of the Rastafarian movement) became emperor, taking the name Haile Selassie I. Haile Selassie continued Ethiopia’s modernization, attempted to form international alliances, and resisted European colonial expansion, despite British and Italian attempts to increase their neighboring colonial territories.
Italy, under its fascist ruler Benito Mussolini (18831945), again attempted to enlarge its African colonial empire with a second assault against Ethiopia. Mussolini also wanted to avenge Italy’s humiliating loss to Ethiopia in 1896. The Italians invaded Ethiopia in 1935; other European powers failed to intervene, despite their obligations under the League of Nations, which called for sanctions to be applied against aggressor states.
Ethiopian Fighters. A group of Ethiopian fighters assembles during the 1935 Italian invasion of the African kingdom.
Ethiopian Fighters. A group of Ethiopian fighters assembles during the 1935 Italian invasion of the African kingdom.
The British and French were willing to appease Mussolini and refused to provide any real support for the emperor. Haile Selassie’s departure from Ethiopia and his personal appeal to the League of Nations in 1936 was ineffective, and the Italians occupied Ethiopia, fusing it with their Somali and Eritrean territories to form the colony of Italian East Africa. Ethiopian popular resistance to Italian occupation was brutally suppressed; the Italians bombed hospitals and ambulances, used biological weapons, and massacred civilians.
With the beginning of World War II in 1939, Ethiopia sought help from the British and other allies against the Italians. Italy declared war against Britain in 1940, and together British and Ethiopian forces were able to defeat the Italian military in East Africa, allowing the emperor to return in 1941. After the war Ethiopia retained its independence, though the British remained influential in Ethiopian affairs until 1955, whenEthiopia sought greater contacts with the United States. In the 1960s Haile Selassie’s government became increasingly corrupt and ineffectual, failing to respond effectively to famines and popular discontent. In 1974 a socialist revolution overthrew the emperor and installed a repressive Marxist regime governed by a council called the Derg. The Derg was itself defeated in 1991 by a popular front, and Ethiopia became a democracy. Eritrea was separated from Ethiopia and became an independent country in 1991, but border disputes and occasional warfare continue between the two countries. Agitation by other ethnic groups against central government domination and conflicts with neighboring countries continue to plague modern Ethiopia. Today one of the world’s poorest countries, Ethiopia is important as a symbol of the African anticolonial struggle.

http://what-when-how.com/western-colonialism/ethiopia-western-colonialism/

Saturday, March 9, 2013

Menelik II

Menelik (Menilik) II (1844-1913) was an Ethiopian emperor, who preserved the independence of his people by defeating a major Italian military expedition and who strengthened his kingdom through expansion and political and economic modernization.
Menelik II was born Sahle Mariam on August 19, 1844, in Ankober, one of the capitals of the autonomous central Ethiopian province of Shoa. The infant boy was formally named by his paternal grandfather, Sahle Sellasie, who was the first Shoan leader to rise to become a negus, or king. The name, Menelik, recalls the legendary son of Solomon and the queen of Sheba who, according to Ethiopian tradition, was the first ruler of Ethiopia, and the one to whom the family traced its ancestry. The story is told that the old Shoan king foretold that the boy would one day be a great man who would rebuild the Ethiopian empire. That such a day would come, however, was anything but certain since Ethiopia was then beset by wars and rebellions and lacked any strong, centralized authority.
Shoan independence came to an end following the brief and undistinguished reign of Menelik's father Haile Malakot (1847-55). The Shoan army was defeated by the forces of the Ethiopian emperor Tewodros II (1855-68), and Menelik's father died while on campaign. Along with his mother, a woman of humble origins, and leading Shoan nobles, Menelik was sent into exile at Tewodros's court, and Shoa was incorporated into the renascent Ethiopian empire. The boy was tutored by his guardian, Ato Nedaw, and, beyond receiving a clerical and martial education, learned much about politics from living at the court. Not only was Menelik well treated by Tewodros, but the emperor took a personal interest in the youth's education. Menelik rose to become a dejazmach, or earl, and married Altash, Tewodros's daughter.
By 1865, Menelik was faced with a difficult personal decision. Shoa had broken away from Tewodros's fledgling empire and a usurper claimed the Shoan throne. Deciding to flee the imperial court to reclaim his patrimony, Menelik quickly defeated the Shoan usurper and proclaimed himself negus. The young king built his power base from the Shoan army and conservative nobles. At the same time, he pursued enlightened policies such as extending religious toleration to Muslims and animists in his Christian kingdom. Fortunately for the young monarch, Shoa was relatively insulated from the civil wars which ravaged northern Ethiopia during the last years of Tewodros's reign. When Tewodros became involved in a diplomatic imbroglio with Great Britain over the taking of British hostages, Menelik remained neutral. Unable or unwilling to move against his former benefactor, Menelik's failure to join forces with the Europeans resulted in a major setback for the Shoan's ambitions after a British expeditionary force defeated Tewodros at Magdala in 1868. With Tewodros dead, power now passed to a rival named Kasa who used British arms to advance his claim to the imperial title. Although Menelik had also proclaimed himself emperor, he could only watch and wait when Kasa assumed the crown as Yohannes IV (1872-89).
Menelik had made a serious strategic blunder, as his biographer Harold Marcus points out, but he had also learned the value of using European power and technology for furthering his aspirations. He turned to the Italians and French for weapons as well as to other European countries for Western technology. It was roughly at this time that Alfred Ilg arrived from Zurich and began a long sojourn in Ethiopia, serving as an engineer, architect, and eventually as a trusted advisor to his royal patron. Likewise, Menelik also permitted foreign missionaries to enter his kingdom to convert the Oromo peoples who constituted a significant proportion of the population.
Beyond the importation of technology from Europe, Menelik recognized the importance of establishing diplomatic ties with foreign powers. Although he was forced to renounce his claim to the imperial throne and to do fealty to Yohannes in March 1878, in reality he continued to act as an independent sovereign. The Shoan negus had earlier cultivated the friendship of Egypt in its short-lived attempt at imperialistic expansion into the Horn of Africa. Menelik next went behind Yohannes's back and negotiated with the Mahdists, a group of fundamentalist Muslims who had taken power in neighboring Sudan. Furthermore, Menelik had long maintained friendly relations with Victorian England and had, in 1883, entered into a treaty of amity and commerce with the Italians.
The other significant development during this part of Menelik's life was the expansion of the Shoan kingdom. Imperialist adventures were made necessary by the need for increased revenues to pay tribute to Yohannes. Blocked toward the north by Yohannes, Shoan armies marched south into Oromo-speaking areas and to the east where they conquered the Muslim emirate of Harar. Using arms purchased from the West, these expeditions not only plundered these prosperous regions, but also gave Menelik access to important trade routes and new sources of ivory and slaves. Moreover, the Shoans established fortified villages throughout the newly conquered territories from which they maintained control and into which settlers and missionaries came from the north. Such colonization led to the diffusion of Shoa's Amharic culture into these newly aggrandized lands. This Amharization was a significant development because it contributed to the integration of diverse societies into Menelik's burgeoning empire. It is important to note that by forcing Menelik to pay tribute, Yohannes's policies had the paradoxical effect of strengthening his rival. Indeed, these decades were a turning point in Ethiopian history as there was a strategic shift in the locus of wealth and power in Ethiopia from the north to the south.
Menelik's growing might put him on a collision course with Yohannes. At a time when Yohannes was preparing to fight the Italians, Menelik concluded a secret agreement with Italy (1887), whereby he exchanged Shoan neutrality for European weapons. Although nominally a subject to Yohannes, Menelik even proposed that he act as a mediator between the Ethiopian emperor and Italy. However, the seemingly inevitable confrontation between the Ethiopian rivals was not to be. At the battle of Metemma in March 1889, Yohannes died fighting, not Menelik or the Italian colonialists, but a Mahdist army. Henceforward, no force could stand in the way of Menelik's ambitions.
Acting quickly, Menelik was crowned negus negast (king of kings), or emperor, on November 3, 1889. By May the following year, he had concluded the famous Treaty of Wichale with the Italian representative Pietro Antonelli. As the historian G.N. Sanderson has observed, the treaty was important because it insured that Italy would not recognize any other claim to Menelik's imperial title. For the Italians, the treaty confirmed their special relationship with Ethiopia.
From this point forward, however, relations between Italy and Ethiopia progressively degenerated. It soon was revealed that there was a difference in the Amharic and Italian translations of Article XVII of the Treaty of Wichale. Basing their assertion on the Italian text of the treaty, Italy claimed protectorate status over Ethiopia even though the Amharic version recognized Menelik's sovereignty. Beyond this diplomatic deception, Menelik became more and more suspicious of Italian ambitions in the northern Ethiopian province of Tigre. He renounced the treaty in 1893 and, even while famine raged in his kingdom, imposed new taxes to pay off the huge debts he owed to Italy. The failure of Italian attempts to divide and conquer Ethiopia through an alliance with rebellious Tigre ultimately led Italy to take more forceful measures. Italian forces moved into Tigre in December 1894, and Italy publicly proclaimed Ethiopia as its protectorate. In September of the following year, Menelik called for the mobilization of Ethiopia. Able to amass an army of 120,000 men, the emperor moved north and at Adwa, on March 1, 1896, met an overconfident Italian expeditionary force composed of 20,000 troops. By inflicting a crushing defeat on the Italians (70% of whom were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoner), Menelik won Ethiopia another 40 years of independence.
The battle at Adwa also put an end to centuries of Ethiopian isolation. Menelik had demonstrated to the world that an African kingdom could defeat a European army and diplomats flocked to his new capital, Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian emperor proved himself an astute statesman and beat the Europeans at their own diplomatic game. Pragmatic in victory, Menelik did not seek to expel the Italians from their colony of Eritrea; instead, he settled for Italy's recognition of Ethiopian independence. Moreover he used the Europeans' concept of "effective occupation" to wring territorial concessions from neighboring French and British colonies. Finally, Menelik's policy of detente with Mahdist Sudan saved Ethiopia from continued warfare with his Muslim neighbors.
With the threat of foreign intervention removed, Menelik spent the last active decade of his rule strengthening centralized power and modernizing Ethiopia's political system. In the provinces, he replaced hereditary rulers with appointed officials and garrisoned troops in some of the empire's potentially rebellious districts. Changes were also made in the judicial system whereby appellate judges were placed over the provinces. As the emperor sought to enhance the national power of Ethiopia, he increasingly took a direct hand in administration and, like the great French monarch, Louis XIV, he identified himself with the state. Only when he recognized the nature of his declining health, did Menelik create Ethiopia's first cabinet in 1907. In addition, he sought to regularize taxation and end a system whereby soldiers in effect looted the peasantry.
In his last years, Menelik promoted a host of notable reforms in Ethiopia. Bridges and modern roads were built, a postal system was organized, and telegraph lines were erected. More important still, a railroad was begun which eventually linked Addis Ababa with the French-controlled Red Sea port of Djibouti. The creation of this transportation and communications infrastructure opened new markets as well as contributing to the national integrity of the empire. Among many other changes which occurred in this period were the introduction of a national currency and mint, as well as the establishment of the Bank of Abyssinia. The capital had its first hotel, Western-style school, and hospital, and a state printing press began operations in 1911.
Menelik at the height of his power was often compared with the great German nation-builder, Otto von Bismarck. Along with his diplomatic and military accomplishments, there was near unanimity among foreign visitors as to his intelligence and ability. Fascinated by Western machinery and technology, Menelik took a personal interest in photography, medicine, and mechanical devices.
Perhaps the greatest failure of his reign was his inability to provide for a stable succession. Beginning in 1906, he suffered a series of apoplectic seizures and gradually began to lose his faculties. The emperor designated his grandson, Lij Iyasu, as heir in 1908, and a regency was created since Iyasu was still a youth. By Octoer 1909, Menelik lay paralyzed and totally incapacitated. With the emperor supine, his wife, the empress Taitu, ruled in all but name until she was deposed by a palace coup in 1910. The untimely death of the regent and the impetuosity of young Lij Iyasu further contributed to the breakdown of centralized authority in Ethiopia. While the emperor lingered on, much of the work which he had done to build a strong national monarchy came undone. The merciful denouement came on the night of December 12-13, 1913, when Menelik breathed his last. The great task of modernizing Ethiopia lay unfinished and would be left to another great emperor—Haile Selassie.

Further Reading

A good analysis of Menelek is in Harold Marcus's chapter in Lewis Gann, ed., Colonialism in Africa, vol. 1 (1969). Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History (1965), is a good general history of the country, and Edward Ullendorff, The Ethiopians (1960; 2d ed. 1965), is a fine treatment of the people and their culture.

Additional Sources

Akpan, M. B. "Liberia and Ethiopia, 1880-1914: the Survival of Two African States," in General History of Africa, VII. Edited by A. Adu Boahen, University of California Press, 1985.
Berkeley, G.F-H. The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik. 1902, reprinted, Negro Universities Press, 1969.
Lipschutz, Mark R., and R. Kent Rasmussen. Dictionary of African Historical Biography. Aldine, 1978.
Marcus, Harold G. "Imperialism and expansionism in Ethiopia from 1865 to 1900," in Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960. Vol. 1. Edited by L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan. Cambridge University Press, 1969.
—. The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844-1913, Clarendon Press, 1975; Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1995.
Prather, Ray, The King of Kings of Ethiopia, Menelik II, Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1981.
Prouty, Chris, and Eugene Rosenfeld. Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia. Scarecrow Press, 1981.
Pankhurst, Richard. History of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, 1970.
Prouty, Chris. Empress Taytu and Menilek II: Ethiopia 1883-1910. Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1986. □

Friday, March 8, 2013

Lost Crops of Africa: Teff


Tef (Eragrostis tef) is a significant crop in only one country in the world—Ethiopia. There, however, its production exceeds that of most other cereals. Each year, Ethiopian farmers plant almost 1.4 million hectares of tef,1 and they produce 0.9 million tons of grain, or about a quarter of the country's total cereals.2
The grain is especially popular in the western provinces, where people prefer it to all other cereals and eat it once or twice (occasionally three times) every day. In that area, tef contributes about two-thirds of the protein to a typical diet.
Most tef is made into injera, a flat, spongy, and slightly sour bread that looks like a giant bubbly pancake the size of a serving tray. People tear off pieces and use them to scoop up spicy stews that constitute the main meals. For the middle and upper classes it is the preferred staple; for the poor it is a luxury they generally cannot afford.
Unlike many of the species in this book, tef is not in decline. Indeed, farmers have steadily increased their plantings in recent years. The area cultivated rose from less than 40 percent of Ethiopia's total cereal area in 1960 to more than 50 percent in 1980.
Tef is so overwhelmingly important in Ethiopia that its absence elsewhere is a mystery. The plant can certainly be grown in many countries. Some has long been produced for food in Yemen, Kenya (near Marsabit), Malawi, and India, for example. Also, the plant is widely grown as a forage for grazing animals in South Africa and Australia.
Now, however, the use of tef as a cereal for humans is transcending the boundaries of Ethiopia. Commercial production has begun in both the United States and South Africa, and international markets are opening up. This is because Ethiopian restaurants have recently
1  
The common name is often spelled "teff' or "t'ef' in English. We recommend "tef': it is simple, unconfusing, and perhaps a good marketing name that might help the crop's future expansion and acceptance worldwide.
2  
According to statistics of the mid-1980s, tef produced 23 percent of Ethiopia's cereal grain. The others were sorghum (26 percent), maize (21.7 percent), barley (17 percent), and wheat (12.4 percent).
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=2305&page=215

Monday, February 4, 2013

የጤፍ አዋዛጋቢነትና ናጎያ ፣


ባለፈው ሳምንት በዚህ ክፍለ ጊዜ ፣ እንዳወሳነው ፣ በዓለም ውስጥ ፣ ኢትዮጵያ ብቻ የተገኘውና ለብዙ ሺ ዓመታት ፤ በኢትዮጵያ አርሶ አደሮች እየለማ ተጠብቆ የኖረው፤ ጤፍ ፣ በአሁኑ ዘመን ፤ ከኢትዮጵያ ተወስዶ በሌሎች አገሮች እየተዘራ ጥቅም በመስጠት
ላይ ይገኛል። ጤፍ ፤ ከኢትዮጵያ አልፎ በዓለም አቀፍ ደረጃ፤ ለምግብነት ያለው ጠቀሜታ ይበልጥ ታዋቂነት እያስገኘለት ነው። ጤፍንና የእርሱ ተዛማጅ የሆኑትን የእህል ዓይነቶች ማሽላ፣ ዳጉሣንና የመሳሰሉትን እንዲህ ተፈላጊ ያደረጋቸው ምን እንደሆነ ባለፈው ሳምንት ዶ/ር መላኩ ወረደ ከጀመሩልን በመቀጠል እንዲህ ያብራራሉ።
አሁን እንዳዳመጣችሁት፤ ጤፍ በውስጡ ከሚገኙ አካል ጠጋኝ ማዕድናትና ቪታሚን (ቪታሚን D 6 ) ሌላ ተመራጭ ያደረገው ፣ በገብስ፤ ስንዴና አጃ በመሳሰሉ እህሎች ዱቄቱ ፤ ሲቦካ ፤ ሊጡ እንደ ላስቲክ እንዲሳብ የሚያደርገው የፕሮቲን ቅልቅል የሆነው Gluten የተባለው ንጥረ ነገር የሌለበት በመሆኑ ነው ። ታዲያ ፤ «ግሉተን» ያለባቸውን ምግቦች አንጀታቸው ለማይቀበል፣ ለሚጠናወታቸው ሰዎች፣ ጤፍ ተስማሚነቱ አያጠራጥርም። ከጤፍ ጋር ተያይዞ ፣ «ከግሉተን ነጻ የሆነ ምግብ» የሚባለው ዘይቤ በዚህ በምዕራቡ ዓለም የተለመደ ሆኗል።
የጤፍን ሰብልነት ፤ የጤፍን ጠቀሜታ፣ ማነው ዘመናት ሙሉ ጠብቆ ለዓለም ያስተዋወቀው? ውርጭ፤ ተባይ በቀላሉ የማያጠቃው ምን ዓይነት ባህርይ ቢኖረው ነው?
ከኢትዮጵያ ጋር ፣ ጤፍን በጋራ ለመጠቀም በሚል ስምምነት ከኢትዮጵያ ጋር ተዋውሎ ከሠርሁ በማለት፤ ለኢትዮጵያ አርሶ አደሮች አንዳች ጠቀሜታ ያልሰጠው Crop and Soil (HPFI) የተሰኘው የኔደርላንድ ኩባንያ፤ ባለፈው ዝግጅት እንደጠቀስነው፤ ሌላ ስም ያላቸው ሌሎች ኩባንያዎች አቋቁሞ፣ ኩባንያው፤ በአውሮፓ የጤፍ ዱቄትን ከሌሎች አዝርእት ዱቄት ጋር ቀላቅሎ የተለያዩ የምግብ ዓይነት የሚያቀርብበት ሰፋ ያለ የባለቤትነት መብት ያለው መሆኑን በአውሮፓ አስመዝግቦ ይህን ራሱ ላቋቋማቸውሌሎች ኩባንያዎች አሳልፎ ሰጥቷል። ኩባንያው በጀርመን ሀገርም ተባባሪዎች አሉት። ጤፍ፣ በታህታይ ሳክሰኒ (ኒደርሳኽሰን)ተዘርቶ መብቀልና ማፍራት መቻሉም ታውቋል።
የአዉሮጳ የግኝት ባለቤትነት ሰጪ ጽ/ቤት ዓርማ
ጀርመን ውስጥ በልዩ የምግብ ሱቆች፤ የተፈጥሮ ባህርያቸው በሰው ሠራሽ መንገድ ካልተለወጠም ሆነ ካልተቀየጠ አዝርእት የሚዘጋጁ የምግብ ዓይነቶችና ዱቄት በሚሸጥባቸው ንዑሳን መደብሮች፤ የጤፍ ዱቄት በውድ ዋጋ ነው የሚሸጠው፤ 100 ግራም በአንድ ዩውሮ ገደማ ነው የሚሸጠው። ከሠርሁ ባለው ኩባንያም ሆነ ሌላ ስም በተሰጣቸው ኩባንያዎች ባለቤትነት የሚሠራጨው ታሽጎ የሚሸጠው ጤፍ መሆኑ ነው። ባለፈው ሳምንት በጨረፍታ እንደጠቀስነው፤ ኢትዮጵያ ጥንቃቄ ካላደረገች፤ ወደፊት አርሶ አደሮቿ ጤፍ ለመዝራት የውጭ ኩባንያ ፈቃድ የሚጠይቁበት ሁኔታ ሊከሠት ይችል ይሆናል። እንደ ቴክኒካዊ ግኝቶች የተፈጥሮ ውጤቶችን እዚህም ላይ ለምሳሌ አዝርእትን ፤ የግል ባለንብረት አድርጎ ለማስመዝገብ የሚደረገው ሙከራ ፣ እዚህ አውሮፓ ውስጥ ዋና ጽ/ቤቱ በሙዩኒክ (ሙዑንሸን) የሚገኘውን የፈጠራ ውጤት ወይም ግኝት ማስመዝገቢያ ጽ/ቤት (European Patent Office)ጭምር ማለት ነው አላሳሰበም አይባልም። «ባዮ ፓቴንት» እጅግ አነጋጋሪና አሳሳቢም ጉዳይ ነው። ለማንኛውም፣ የራስን ንብረት መጠበቅ እንጂ ፣ በማንኛውም መልኩ ለሌላ አሳልፎ መስጠት ኀላፊነት ከሚሰማው ከየትኛውም ወገን አይጠበቅም።
ኢትዮጵያ፤ የጤፍን ዘር ለዓለም ያስተዋወቀች ሆና ሳለ፤ ጠብቀው ያቆዩት አርሶ አደሮቿ
ሳይጠቀሙ ሌሎች ብልጣ ብልጥ ባዕዳን ኩባንያዎች ለመቆጣጠር የሚያደርጉት ሙከራ
በቂ ማስጠንቀቂያ ይመስለናል። ሃገራት የተፈጥሮ ሃብታቸውን የአዝርእት ባለቤትነታቸው ታውቆ እንዲከበር የናጎያ ስምምነት ናጎያ ፕሮቶኮል ምን ዓይነት ዋስትና የሚሰጥ ነው? ኢትዮጵያ በዚህ ስምምነት ተሳትፎዋ ምን ይመስላል? የብዝሃ ህይወት ንብረትን በመጠበቅ ረገድስ ከዜጎች ምንድን ነው የሚጠበቀው? በግብርና ሚንስቴር የብዝሃ ህይወት ጥበቃ ተቋም (ኢንስቲቱት) ዋና ሥራ መሪ(ዳይሬክተር ) ዶ/ር ገመዲ ዳሌ ---
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